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VARIATIONS ON A THEME IN CONFLICT OF
LAWS
Joseph Dainow*
The spelling out of a variety of thoughts on a particular
topic may be the fruit of painstaking perseverance or the de-
scription of an inspired idea; in this instance, the observations
and comments here noted have been stimulated by a judicial de-
cision. It is refreshing to find a Louisiana conflict of laws case
in which there is a good threshing out of several conflicts prob-
lems, dealt with in a forthright manner.
I
In Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Hulett,' suit was brought
for a deficiency after the sale of a repossessed automobile failed
to bring enough to pay the balance due on the purchase price.
The conditional sale of the car had been made by a contract
executed in Indiana, and presumably delivery of the car was
made in Indiana. With the knowledge and consent of the vendor,
the car was taken to Louisiana, where it was later repossessed
upon vendee's default in payments. The car was taken back to
Indiana, where it was resold, and then the present suit for the
deficiency was brought in Louisiana. Although the creditor
complied with the requirements of Indiana procedure for the
preservation of a right to claim the deficiency, there had been
no appraisement as required by the Louisiana Deficiency Judg-
ment Act. Holding that the right to claim a deficiency must be
determined by Louisiana law, the court of appeal affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit.
In a very careful and considered opinion, Judge Tate con-
cluded that the whole affair had enough significant connecting
elements with Louisiana to justify application of the Louisiana
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 151 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
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law, without the need to specify a single decisive one. These in-
cluded the factors that: (1) the car was sold to a Louisiana resi-
dent for use in Louisiana, (2) the repossession took place in
Louisiana, and (3) Louisiana had a valid governmental interest
in enforcing its public policy of barring deficiency claims when
repossessed objects are sold without appraisement.
As between an outside creditor and a local debtor, a state
always has an interest in protecting its citizens against any un-
fair dealings or entrapments, but no state purports to shield its
citizens from their just debts. Likewise, a state has a legitimate
governmental interest in the application of its laws to transac-
tions which occur or to things which are located within its ter-
ritory; but there must be a sound basis for the application of its
laws to people and events located elsewhere.
So long as the car in the present case was in Louisiana, there
could be no question about the appropriateness of applying Lou-
isiana law in deciding whether to recognize the reserved interest
of a conditional vendor (or chattel mortgagee) and in what
kinds of situations. However, the legal question in issue was the
creditor's right to claim a deficiency after a resale in Indiana
without appraisement. The repossession in Louisiana and re-
moval to Indiana were made in accordance with the terms of the
original contract and with the consent of the debtor. In connec-
tion with the resale, the creditor observed all the Indiana re-
quirements to protect his claim for a deficiency.
It is hard to say that the Indiana creditor was not justified
in considering the original sale and the resale to be Indiana
transactions governed by Indiana law. Undoubtedly, an Indiana
court could be expected so to hold. Due to the creditor's knowl-
edge that the car was to be located and used in Louisiana, it
would not be unreasonable for a Louisiana court to treat the
original sale as a straight sale and disregard the reservation
of title (or chattel mortgage), but it is quite another matter to
say that in connection with a perfectly valid resale transaction
in Indiana, the creditor must also observe the Louisiana pro-
cedures in order to protect his claim for a deficiency. The re-
quirement of prior appraisement is perforce applicable to all
sales made in Louisiana; but the statute makes no mention of
out-of-state sales. It is doubtful that the legislature could have
intended its application to sales outside of Louisiana. Of course,
Louisiana must be deemed to be as much interested in protect-
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ing its citizens in their transactions wherever these occur, but
in conflicts cases, Louisiana courts do make appropriate deter-
minations in accordance with the proper foreign law pursuant
to the Louisiana rules of conflict of laws.
Apparently, there has not been any previously enunciated
Louisiana rule of conflict of laws concerning the creditor's right
to claim a deficiency after a repossession resale. In the absence
of legislative direction, it is up to the court to decide the case
in accordance with general principles of conflicts law, and this
is what the court purported to do.
The court's conclusion is clear and specific: the lack of ap-
praisement prior to the resale, according to Louisiana law, for-
feited the creditor's claim for a deficiency. However, the anal-
ysis of the decision and its significance are somewhat in doubt.
Where several different bases for decision are grouped together,
this is inevitable. At one point, the opinion appears to accept
the once-traditional theory of comity as the foundation of con-
flict of laws; in some parts, there is use of the now-traditional
approach through the forum's rules for choice of law; finally,
there appears an espousal of the neo-realism theory of govern-
mental interests.
II
The decision enumerates four possible alternative bases for
the conclusion reached, but also describes a number of other
bases which could be used for supporting the application of Lou-
isiana law.
A. Treating the matter as a problem in contract and re-
garding "the significant factor as being that the vehicle was
sold to Louisiana residents for use in Louisiana, ' ' 2 the court con-
sidered that the question of the creditor's right to a deficiency
should be decided by Louisiana law because "the law of the place
where the contract is to have effect determines the rights and
obligations of the parties." 3 This is asserted as applying to all
issues arising as the consequences of an original contract, all of
which are to be treated in the same way as incidents of one
2. Id. at 711.
3. Id. at 707, citing several Louisiana cases. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 10:
"The form and effect of public and private written instruments are governed by
the laws and usages of the places where they are passed or executed.
"But the effect of acts passed in one country to have effect in another coun-
try, is regulated by the laws of the country where such acts are to have effect...."
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transaction. This has not been the doctrine nor the practice;
actually, the development of conflicts law on contracts has been
in the opposite direction toward a greater diversification of
specific choice-of-law rules for different kinds of potential
issues (capacity, form, performance, breach, damages, limita-
tions or liberative prescription, and so forth; also distinguishing
between movables and immovables, sales and mortgages, and
so forth) .4 In jurisdictions where contrary movements have set
in to reduce this diversity, the conflicts rule has shifted from
a single determinative factor to a reference of a more general
nature (e.g., center of gravity).5 In any event, it does seem to
be stretching a long way to consider the problem of a creditor's
claim for deficiency after resale as an incident of the original
contract. Furthermore, if the original sale had been for use in
Mississippi by a Mississippian who later moved to Louisiana, it
is hardly likely that this Louisiana court would decide the cred-
itor's right to claim a deficiency after resale in accordance with
Mississippi law.
B. The court does get closer to the specific issue when it
focuses on "the significant factor ... that the repossession took
place thereafter in Louisiana."6 However, the place of repos-
session could quite easily have been anywhere else, and if it had
occurred in a third state without any other contacts, it is hardly
conceivable that this Louisiana court would have decided the
question in accordance with the law of that state.
C. Another possibility of a single-decisive-contact rule is
indicated as the law of the situs of mortgaged property for de-
termining the right to recover a deficiency.7 However, in the
present case there was no mortgage; and furthermore this situs
rule is appropriate where there is involved some title interest
in the property, which is not the question here.
D. As a more general kind of a choice-of-law approach, the
court stated that "a combination of all these factors [including
the governmental interest in enforcing its public policy, to be
considered below] indicates that it is more appropriate for the
Louisiana law to be applied by a Louisiana court in deciding this
4. Cf. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 225-78 (3d ed. 1963) ;
EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 453-540 (1962) ; RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 311-376 (1934).
5. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 240 (3d ed. 1963) ; LEFLAR,
THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 240, § 125 (1959).
6. 151 So. 2d at 711.
7. Id. at 708.
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matter, than that of another forum which has less significant
factual connections with the matter in litigation." This ap-
proach is supposedly an objective one, sometimes called the "cen-
ter of gravity" conflicts rule, or the law of the place which has
the most significant grouping of contactsY In view of Indiana's
contacts as the place of the original sale, delivery of the car,
removal after repossession within contemplation of the original
contract, and especially as the place of resale, it is doubtful
whether a really objective evaluation of contacts would place the
center of gravity in Louisiana. An Indiana court would pre-
sumably think otherwise; a court in a third state would more
likely agree with Indiana.
E. Perhaps the most significant basis of decision is in the
very modernistic vein of "governmental interests" (as distin-
guished from local public policy discussed below). Of course,
Louisiana has a governmental interest in its people, in transac-
tions and property within the state, in the proper application of
its laws, and so forth. By the same token, so does Indiana. The
interests of one are as legitimate as the other, and on the basis
of an objective comparison it can hardly be said that the inter-
ests of Indiana should be subordinated to those of Louisiana.
Reference is made to the California decision in Bernkrant v.
Fowler,'0 written by Judge Roger Traynor, who is the most, and
perhaps the only, prominent American judge "frankly utilizing
the approach of balancing the interests of the forum against
those of the foreign jurisdiction as a guide to deciding choice-of-
law problems."" However, it is particularly interesting to note
that, in the cited case, Judge Traynor concluded that Nevada
had greater interests than California and decided the case ac-
cording to Nevada law.
F. A more arbitrary, subjective approach on the basis of
governmental interests is to start with the premise that, if there
is any governmental interest in the application of the local rule,
the court should use this law of the forum unless there are over-
powering reasons to use the rule of another state. This extreme
interpretation of the governmental interest theory12 has not yet
8. Id. at 711.
9. Supra note 5.
10. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906 (1961).
11. 151 So. 2d 705, 711 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
12. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). See also
EHRENZwEIO, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 307 et aeq., 347 et seq.
(1962).
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received many adherents; neither in the expressions of current
writers nor in the published opinions of the judges. When, in
the Hulett case, Judge Tate made the statement: "We see no
reason why the Louisiana law relating to deficiency judgments
should not be applied under these circumstances,'- 3 this reflect-
ed a strong subjective approach toward the use of local law. A
concomitant aspect of the extreme governmental interest ap-
proach is the rejection completely of all choice-of-laws rules as
such. In the light of the whole opinion, it does not seem that the
court or the writer of the opinion is prepared to go that far.
G. Finally, there is also mentioned the "public policy bar-
ring deficiency judgments when chattels of Louisiana debtors
are repossessed in Louisiana and subsequently sold without ap-
praisement."'1 4 In conflicts cases, the public policy bar is a pure-
ly negative factor in that it operates exclusively as a corrective
to prevent what would be the logical conclusion of the forum's
own conflicts rule in a particular case.' 5 Thus, if the present
case is disposed of by the public policy bar, Judge Tate's reason-
ing must, by necessary inference, be that the appropriate Lou-
isiana conflicts rule is one whose reference (as a single decisive
one or as a grouping) would direct the court to the law of In-
diana; but that the result produced by Indiana law would be so
obnoxious and repugnant to the fundamental mores of our so-
ciety that it must be barred on the grounds of local public policy,
leaving the outcome of the case to be decided by the law of the
forum.
There is no question that the Louisiana legislature expressed
itself very strongly on the public policy underlying the Defi-
ciency Judgment Act, and the courts have so interpreted it.
However, in the first place, the statute does not expressly apply
to sales outside of Louisiana, and there is no substantial or ade-
quate basis to conclude that the legislature had any such inten-
tion. Secondly, there is more than ample room for the contrary
opinion that the Indiana rule on this point, while different from
the Louisiana law, is not so obnoxious as to be repugnant and
unacceptable. The Indiana law requires the observance of cer-
tain prerequisites (but not prior appraisement) in connection
with a resale transaction if the creditor wants to protect his
13. 151 So. 2d at 711.
14. Ibid. See also id. at 708, n. 1.
15. Dainow, Policy Problems in Conflicts Cases, 35 TEX. L. REV. 759 (1957)
Paulsen and Sovern, Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws, 50 COLUM. L. REV.
969 (1956).
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claim for a deficiency; failure to do so defeats the claim.,le Under
Louisiana law, to preserve the creditor's claim for a deficiency,
there must be an appraisement.' 7 Thus, both laws deal with the
same problem, and both have provided certain procedures to
protect the debtor's interest in connection with the creditor's
claim for a deficiency where the sale proceeds are insufficient
to satisfy the entire indebtedness. Since the basic policy is the
same, can it be said objectively that the Indiana law falls so far
below the standard of the Louisiana law that the result is so
repugnant to the good morals and basic legal concepts of Louisi-
ana as to violate public policy, in the conflict-of-laws sense? If
the answer is in the affirmative, then regardless of the place
(or places) of original sale, delivery, use and maintenance, re-
possession, and resale without appraisement, any suit for a de-
ficiency in a Louisiana court would have to be dismissed, on the
single contact of the court's personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant.'8
III
At this point, it is in order to ask why we have this choice-
of-law operation altogether; why go in for such frustrating legal
gymnastics? In reply to this question, a number of reasons have
been given. Without going into their explanatory historical
backgrounds, the following are some of the more frequently en-
countered ones.
A. In certain stages of legal history, law was considered
personal, and an individual was to be judged by his personal
law. This idea still persists in the many rules which determine
legal issues according to the law of a person's domicile (or na-
tionality), as the place to which he belongs and to whose juris-
diction he is subject.
B. The doctrine of "comity" or courtesy between sovereigns
is still sometimes given as the reason why one will apply the law
16. 151 So. 2d at 707.
17. LA. R.S. 13:4106, 13:4107 (1950).
18. Although not mentioned in the decision of the Hulett case, the additional
argument might be made that the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act establishes
the resale procedure (including appraisement) which must be complied with in
order to preserve a creditor's potential claim for a deficiency, and since matters
of procedure are always decided in accordance with the law of the forum, it was
proper to apply the Louisiana law. Without going into the basic question of
whether the appraisement or the creditor's claim for deficiency are matters of
substance or procedure, the argument misses the target because under no circum-
stances would a court of one state (Indiana) be expected to observe the proce-
dures of another state (Louisiana), when the latter differs from its own.
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of another in appropriate situations. This has been done as a
sort of cooperation, sometimes on a basis of reciprocity (with
an eye to the future as well as the past), but always as a mat-
ter of discretion.
C. With greater mobility among people, especially between
the American states, and increased activity in the international
sphere, one purpose of the choice-of-law and conflicts rules is
to make for some degree of uniformity in result regardless of
where litigation may occur. This also discourages the undesir-
able practice of "forum-shopping" where a defendant is ame-
nable to the jurisdiction of several states or countries.
D. By developing some standardized pattern of conflicts
rules, there is provided an increasing measure of stability and
reliability for both private and commercial transactions as well
as for questions of status, property, successions, and so forth.
E. When people act in good faith relying for the determina-
tion of their rights and responsibilities upon the law of the place
where their transactions occur or where their property is lo-
cated, their justified expectations should be protected by the
conflicts rules which look to the law of the place where docu-
ments were drawn up, where contracts were entered into, where
property is situated, and so forth.
F. Sometimes it is said that the purpose of conflicts rules
for choice of law is to assure fairness in balancing the interests
of all the parties concerned, in contrast to the absence of cQn-
flicts rules which would mean the application of the law of the
forum in all cases regardless of the number and nature of fac-
tors connected with other jurisdictions.
G. Most recently, conflicts rules are also supported as the
means of balancing governmental interests so as to give effect
to the law of the state which has the greatest interest in the
parties, the property, the transaction, or the application of its
law in the particular case.
There have been, and there will be, adherents of the comity
theory of conflicts of laws, the theory of vested rights, the local
law theory, and the approach of governmental interests. Each
purports to explain the nature and the reasons for choice of law
and also to predict its future development. There have likewise
been powerful critics of each philosophy within a succession of
periods of respective predominance.
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In each case, an attempt is made to formulate a complete
generalization on the basis partly of existing statutes and main-
ly of judicial decisions without recognizing that legislatures and
courts operate a great deal on an ad hoc basis without letting
one theory or another impede their specific objectives. The
scholars make repeated and noble efforts to construct a consis-
tent philosophy for all this legal activity, but they are only try-
ing to find the formula which explains all the things that have
been done, when in fact there has not been and there is not likely
to be such complete consistency in what appear as successive
series of pragmatic operations.
There are differences among the scholars, and their work is
indispensable to the development of the law, but for a long time
they have been unanimous on one point. Where a case involves
relevant factors associated with two or more jurisdictions, it is
in order to consider whether the legal issue should be decided in
accordance with one law or another. At the present stage of de-
velopment, it hardly seems in line to revert to the primitive posi-
tion of dealing with all cases, the conflicts cases as well as the
local cases, within the framework of the internal law of the
forum and excluding systematic consideration of some other
law. This is about what we would have with the extreme inter-
pretation of the governmental interests theory which would
apply the law of forum whenever there is any local interest in
doing so.
IV
The Hulett case draws support from several diversified
sources as bases of decision, thereby leaving in doubt the extent
of its influence in the further development of Louisiana conflicts
law. This does not detract from the importance of the opinion
in bringing up all these choice-of-law issues and discussing them
in a forthright fashion. The method, the approach, and the ap-
preciation of the nature of the problems, reveal a renewed and a
healthy inquiry into conflicts problems for what they are.
With all its variations on the choice-of-law theme, the de-
cision in the Hulett case can be placed in several different levels
of discourse, as previously indicated.
On the analytical level, the argument based upon public pol-
icy is the strongest, although not formulated in the usual man-
ner. However, it is hard to agree that the difference in the
1964]
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Louisiana and Indiana procedures for resale is so great as to be
obnoxious and repugnant to the public morals and social welfare
of the forum.
On the pragmatic level, the governmental interest approach
is new and appealing. However, there is something undesirably
arbitrary in the position that the law of the forum should be
applied unless there is very powerful reason not to.
On the pure choice-of-law level, a choice based upon the most
significant grouping of contacts often makes very good sense,
but there is room for doubt as to where this is in the facts of
the Hulett case.
Without subscribing to a rigorous mechanical application of
conflicts rules or to a super-activity of the imagination in the
characterization of legal issues, it is in keeping with the fabric
of the rest of the law to see that a number of different issues
could have been involved in the sum total of the relationships
between the parties in the Hulett case. As it happens, there was
no issue concerning the validity of the original sale (as to ca-
pacity, form, or content). There was no dispute concerning the
propriety and legality of the repossession in Louisiana and the
removal to Indiana. No question was raised about the validity
of the resale or the rights of the purchaser. One and only one
issue was in dispute, and that was whether the creditor had
done everything he should have done in order to preserve a
claim for the deficiency in event the resale proceeds were insuf-
ficient to discharge fully the balance of the debt.
This issue is strictly and exclusively an incident of the resale
transaction, and the significant Indiana contacts are the place
of the resale, the situs of the car (with consent of both parties),
and the Indiana governmental interest in the observance of its
laws for activities within its territories. The only Louisiana ele-
ment was the residence of the debtor.
There was no indication that the creditor took any undue or
unfair advantage of the debtor; there was no contest concerning
the validity of the debtor's original agreement and subsequent
consent concerning repossession in Louisiana, removal to In-
diana, and resale in Indiana. There was no question raised about
the validity of the resale, in conformity with Indiana law. The
incidents of this resale transaction, including the creditor's right
to claim a deficiency, should likewise be decided in accordance
with Indiana law.
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On the characterization of the creditor's right to claim a
deficiency as an incident of the resale transaction, or on the con-
flicts rule which looks to the most significant grouping of con-
tacts, the question should have been decided in accordance with
Indiana laW.
Even on the basis of greater governmental interest, the Lou-
isiana court would have been more in keeping with the general
principles of conflict of laws to have dealt with the matter in
that way. In view of the facts that (1) a legislature is ordi-
narily concerned with enacting laws to govern purely local trans-
actions, 19 and (2) there is nothing in the text or elsewhere to
show an express or imputed legislative intent that the Louisiana
Deficiency Judgment Act should apply to out-of-state sales, it is
possible to paraphrase the concluding sentence of Judge Tray-
nor's opinion as follows: "Since there is thus no conflict between
the law of California [Louisiana] and the law of Nevada [In-
diana], we can give effect to the common policy of both states
to enforce lawful contracts [and of providing protective proce-
dures in creditor sales] and sustain Nevada's [Indiana's] inter-
est in protecting its residents and their reasonable expectations
growing out of a transaction substantially related to that state
without subordinating any legitimate interest of this state.120
19. Cf. Judge Traynor in Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 594 (1961).
20. Id. at 596.
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